Worldview: The China strategy and the ADIZ
By Trudy Rubin, Inquirer Columnist
POSTED: December 06, 2013
Vice President Biden was busy shuttling this week from Japan to China,
trying to defuse tensions over a new air-defense zone that China has
set up over disputed islands in the East China Sea.
To many observers, it may have appeared that China had overreached by
unilaterally declaring the zone, and that Beijing had to back down
when the United States and Japan continued to send in military flights
without filing the flight plans that China demanded.
But, as described in a talk by Toshi Yoshihara, a U.S. Naval War
College expert on China's maritime strategy, China's move is part of a
calculated, incremental strategy. The goal: to exert naval and air
dominance over much of the Pacific, replacing American primacy - and
to get other countries in the region to recognize that dominance
without a war.
Yoshihara's lecture, sponsored by Philadelphia's Foreign Policy
Research Institute, was so fascinating that it's worth a partial
summary, especially since it reveals much about how China views itself
and its future global role.
Everyone knows that China has become an economic superpower, but the
country's global ambitions are murkier. As a trading power, China
makes heavy use of "the global commons" - sea lanes, air space, outer
space, and cyberspace. "Because China has such a huge stake, you would
think they'd have an interest in maintaining an open commons," says
Yoshihara. However, he adds, "We don't have a full grasp" of China's
ambitions, or of what China wants to be when it rises to the heights
of its power.
What we do know, he says, is that "the Chinese have been busy cranking
out ships and submarines at a rate not expected 10 years ago." A
decade ago, experts pooh-poohed the idea that the Chinese would have a
capable blue-water navy in the foreseeable future. But Beijing
commissioned its first aircraft carrier in 2012.
There is a whole Chinese military-intellectual complex of scholars,
analysts, and senior officers who passionately advocate the pursuit of
sea power, on TV and in op-ed articles, playing on growing public
nationalist sentiment by taking a strong stand against U.S. naval
dominance in the region.
In part, this passion comes from China's past, when it suffered many
humiliations from seaborne invaders. Yoshihara quotes Wu Shengli,
commander of China's navy: "In China's modern history, imperialists
[Westerners] and colonists [the Japanese] initiated more than 470
invasions of China, including 84 large ones, from the sea." Wu's angst
is evident, says Yoshihara. "He is saying 'never again.'"
And in part the passion for sea dominance comes from Chinese
geography. Chinese mariners can't reach the high seas without passing
through a series of choke points controlled by the United States or
its allies. These choke points include a series of island chains, some
hotly contested, that parallel China's coastline and run from southern
Japan to Taiwan to the Spratly archipelago. China wants to break that
allied control of what it calls "the first island chain."
This brings us back to Biden's visit. The new air-defense zone that
China established includes the air space above Japan's Senkaku
islands, which China claims and calls the Diaoyu islands. The Chinese
zone also overlaps an air-defense zone established long ago by Japan.
Not hard to imagine the potential for trouble there.
While technically an air-defense zone is only supposed to give the
declaring nation the right to track and monitor flights for safety and
security reasons, something else is going on here. Yoshihara says
Beijing's declaration is part of a Chinese "salami strategy." By
getting international pilots to file flight plans with Beijing before
flying over the Senkaku islands, China is seeking "to confer
legitimacy" on its claims over the East China Sea.
Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration quickly advised U.S.
commercial airlines, for safety reasons, to comply with China's
demand. (Japanese commercial liners have refused.)
When he visited Tokyo, Biden made clear that the United States
supports Japan's claim to the islands, and that U.S. military planes
will ignore the request for flight plans. But he didn't demand that
China rescind the zone, and U.S. officials don't believe it would.
Japanese officials, upset at the FAA's quick acquiescence, held their
tongues.
The real question at hand is China's intentions. Yoshihara believes
Beijing hopes to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, while
telling its own people that the United States is conceding China's
growing primacy in the region.
But the bigger question, he says, is China's long-term aim. Does it
accept free passage for all through the global common space, or will
it try to exert control over the air and sea space around islands it
is contesting with Japan, the Philippines, and others? The latter
course would be extremely dangerous because the possibility for
miscalculation is so high.
trubin@phillynews.com
By Trudy Rubin, Inquirer Columnist
POSTED: December 06, 2013
Vice President Biden was busy shuttling this week from Japan to China,
trying to defuse tensions over a new air-defense zone that China has
set up over disputed islands in the East China Sea.
To many observers, it may have appeared that China had overreached by
unilaterally declaring the zone, and that Beijing had to back down
when the United States and Japan continued to send in military flights
without filing the flight plans that China demanded.
But, as described in a talk by Toshi Yoshihara, a U.S. Naval War
College expert on China's maritime strategy, China's move is part of a
calculated, incremental strategy. The goal: to exert naval and air
dominance over much of the Pacific, replacing American primacy - and
to get other countries in the region to recognize that dominance
without a war.
Yoshihara's lecture, sponsored by Philadelphia's Foreign Policy
Research Institute, was so fascinating that it's worth a partial
summary, especially since it reveals much about how China views itself
and its future global role.
Everyone knows that China has become an economic superpower, but the
country's global ambitions are murkier. As a trading power, China
makes heavy use of "the global commons" - sea lanes, air space, outer
space, and cyberspace. "Because China has such a huge stake, you would
think they'd have an interest in maintaining an open commons," says
Yoshihara. However, he adds, "We don't have a full grasp" of China's
ambitions, or of what China wants to be when it rises to the heights
of its power.
What we do know, he says, is that "the Chinese have been busy cranking
out ships and submarines at a rate not expected 10 years ago." A
decade ago, experts pooh-poohed the idea that the Chinese would have a
capable blue-water navy in the foreseeable future. But Beijing
commissioned its first aircraft carrier in 2012.
There is a whole Chinese military-intellectual complex of scholars,
analysts, and senior officers who passionately advocate the pursuit of
sea power, on TV and in op-ed articles, playing on growing public
nationalist sentiment by taking a strong stand against U.S. naval
dominance in the region.
In part, this passion comes from China's past, when it suffered many
humiliations from seaborne invaders. Yoshihara quotes Wu Shengli,
commander of China's navy: "In China's modern history, imperialists
[Westerners] and colonists [the Japanese] initiated more than 470
invasions of China, including 84 large ones, from the sea." Wu's angst
is evident, says Yoshihara. "He is saying 'never again.'"
And in part the passion for sea dominance comes from Chinese
geography. Chinese mariners can't reach the high seas without passing
through a series of choke points controlled by the United States or
its allies. These choke points include a series of island chains, some
hotly contested, that parallel China's coastline and run from southern
Japan to Taiwan to the Spratly archipelago. China wants to break that
allied control of what it calls "the first island chain."
This brings us back to Biden's visit. The new air-defense zone that
China established includes the air space above Japan's Senkaku
islands, which China claims and calls the Diaoyu islands. The Chinese
zone also overlaps an air-defense zone established long ago by Japan.
Not hard to imagine the potential for trouble there.
While technically an air-defense zone is only supposed to give the
declaring nation the right to track and monitor flights for safety and
security reasons, something else is going on here. Yoshihara says
Beijing's declaration is part of a Chinese "salami strategy." By
getting international pilots to file flight plans with Beijing before
flying over the Senkaku islands, China is seeking "to confer
legitimacy" on its claims over the East China Sea.
Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration quickly advised U.S.
commercial airlines, for safety reasons, to comply with China's
demand. (Japanese commercial liners have refused.)
When he visited Tokyo, Biden made clear that the United States
supports Japan's claim to the islands, and that U.S. military planes
will ignore the request for flight plans. But he didn't demand that
China rescind the zone, and U.S. officials don't believe it would.
Japanese officials, upset at the FAA's quick acquiescence, held their
tongues.
The real question at hand is China's intentions. Yoshihara believes
Beijing hopes to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, while
telling its own people that the United States is conceding China's
growing primacy in the region.
But the bigger question, he says, is China's long-term aim. Does it
accept free passage for all through the global common space, or will
it try to exert control over the air and sea space around islands it
is contesting with Japan, the Philippines, and others? The latter
course would be extremely dangerous because the possibility for
miscalculation is so high.
trubin@phillynews.com